CVE-2026-116779 - SignalWire FreeSwitch Code Injection Vulnerability

CVE-2026-116779

FreeSWITCH - RCE via the api Chat Proto Selected by an Inbound SIP MESSAGE To Header

What is FreeSWITCH?

FreeSWITCH is an open-source softswitch: a telephony engine that terminates SIP, bridges and records calls, runs conference bridges and IVR menus, and acts as the media and signalling core for voice platforms. SignalWire maintains it. It is the engine underneath a large number of commercial and self-hosted PBX products, FusionPBX among the best known, and it is routinely deployed by carriers, contact centres, and managed voice providers.

A softswitch is an attractive target for two reasons that compound each other. First, it has to be reachable: SIP ports face the internet or a carrier interconnect by design, and the inbound ACL that protects call setup is not always the same control that protects every other SIP method. Second, what it holds is valuable in itself. The process has the SIP registrar credentials, the carrier trunk accounts that translate directly into toll fraud, call recordings, and the ability to redirect or record live calls. Code execution as the FreeSWITCH user is code execution on the voice infrastructure.

Overview

CVE-2026-116779 turns an inbound SIP MESSAGE, the method used for instant messaging and presence, into arbitrary command execution. In FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 and earlier, sofia_presence_handle_sip_i_message() splits the To header's user part at the first + character and treats the left-hand side as the name of a chat protocol, then dispatches the message to whichever registered chat interface matches. Nothing restricts which protocol a remote sender may select.

The module mod_dptools, loaded in the stock configuration, registers a chat interface named api whose handler passes the message address straight to switch_api_execute(). So a MESSAGE addressed to api+system%20id@target selects the api proto, decodes system id as the address, and runs the system API command with the argument id. The command output comes back as the chat reply, which makes the primitive both reliable and self-reporting. With mod_lua loaded, as it is in a stock build, inline Lua is a second sink reachable the same way.

The path is open in default configurations. Chat handling is enabled unless enable-chat=false is set, and the stock conf/vanilla profiles enable it on both the internal and the external SIP profile. The inbound ACL does not cover the MESSAGE method. SignalWire fixed the issue in 1.11.3 on 2026-08-28 and published the advisory on 2026-10-28 stating that exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild. CISA added it to the KEV catalog on 2026-11-09 with a 2026-11-12 deadline.

Affected Versions

Product Vulnerable Fixed
FreeSWITCH (signalwire/freeswitch) All releases up to and including 1.11.2, which covers the whole 1.11.x line and the 1.10 line before it 1.11.3
FusionPBX and other FreeSWITCH-based platforms Any build bundling FreeSWITCH 1.11.2 or earlier Whatever release of the platform carries FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 or later

Technical Details

The weakness is CWE-77, command injection, with CWE-78 (OS command injection) and CWE-749 (exposed dangerous method or function) also assigned. The plain-language version is that the software let a remote party pick which internal handler would process their message, and one of the available handlers was a command executor. The design mistake is the absence of any separation between chat protocols that deliver messages and chat protocols that execute commands: once the selector is attacker-controlled, the two are the same namespace.

The attack is a single unauthenticated SIP MESSAGE in the common case, needs no user interaction, and the only complexity is URL-encoding the command. CVSS 3.1 scores it 9.8 CRITICAL (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Authentication deserves care, because secondary sources disagree. Since 1.10.7 the auth-messages parameter is on by default, which means the profile demands an account before processing a MESSAGE. But any account on the profile suffices, including one with no permission beyond registering, and the stock conf/vanilla/directory/default/default.xml ships a default user with no password and no a1-hash, which authenticates successfully unless allow-empty-password is set to false. So a stock installation is effectively unauthenticated, and a hardened one is one low-value credential away. The advisory is explicit that auth-messages on its own is not a sufficient control.

Discovery

SignalWire's advisory credits Orn Arnarson as the reporter and Gunnlaugur as the analyst on the finding, and was published by the maintainer andywolk. The fix was committed on 2026-08-26 as PR #3135 and shipped two days later in 1.11.3. The advisory itself did not follow until 2026-10-28, two months after the fixed release, and the CVE record was published on 2026-11-05. The in-the-wild exploitation statement appears in the advisory text rather than in separate vendor reporting.

Exploitation Context

The vendor states that exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild. No threat actor, campaign, or victim count has been attributed publicly, and CISA has not marked the entry for known ransomware use. A proof-of-concept is publicly available on exploit aggregators, so the barrier to opportunistic exploitation is effectively zero.

No exposure census from Shadowserver, Censys, or GreyNoise had been published as of 2026-11-09. The available numbers measure reach rather than exposure: the community safarov/freeswitch Docker image has roughly 1,366,696 pulls and the upstream repository about 5,283 stars. The more useful estimate is structural: internet-reachable SIP is the norm for this software, chat is on by default, and the standard inbound ACL does not filter MESSAGE, so the default posture of a deployment that has not been specifically hardened is reachable.

Note also the sibling identifier CVE-2026-116786, a separate FreeSWITCH command injection assigned at the same time. Operators patching for this one should confirm their target build covers that record as well.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade to FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 or later. The fix adds a per-profile enable-chat-api-proto parameter, off by default, and answers any MESSAGE that selects the api proto with a 403 while logging the source and the requested command. The comparison is case-insensitive, and messages with no proto selector or naming other protos route unchanged.
  2. If you run a platform that bundles FreeSWITCH, such as FusionPBX, check the bundled engine version rather than the platform version, and press the vendor for a build on 1.11.3 or later.
  3. Where an upgrade cannot happen immediately, set enable-chat=false on every SIP profile that does not need inbound SIP chat. This closes the path completely on those profiles and is the only workaround the advisory describes as fully effective.
  4. Do not rely on auth-messages alone. If you must leave chat enabled, remove every directory user with no password and no a1-hash, which in a stock configuration means the default user and the Skinny example, and set allow-empty-password to false. The advisory is clear that this reduces the attack to authenticated exploitation rather than closing it.
  5. Setting disable_system_api_commands=true removes the system API but not the route to switch_api_execute(), so treat it as defence in depth, not a fix. Restricting the inbound ACL likewise does not remove the route.
  6. Review SIP logs for inbound MESSAGE requests whose To user contains a +, especially with api or lua on the left-hand side, and for URL-encoded command text. Look back to at least 2026-08-28, when the fix became public and the vulnerability became easy to rediscover by diffing. Preserve logs and system state before remediating, in line with CISA's Forensics Triage Requirements under BOD 26-04.
  7. Assume compromise on any exposed, unpatched instance: rotate SIP registrar and carrier trunk credentials, review call detail records for unexplained routing, and check for unexpected dialplan or configuration changes.
  8. Federal civilian agencies must remediate or discontinue use by 2026-11-12. Given a public proof-of-concept and a default-on code path, every other operator should treat that date as the outer limit.

Key Details

PropertyValue
CVE ID CVE-2026-116779
Vendor / Product SignalWire - FreeSwitch
NVD Published2026-11-05
NVD Last Modified2026-11-09
CVSS 3.1 Score9.8
CVSS 3.1 VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
SeverityCRITICAL
CWE CWE-77 find similar ↗
CISA KEV Added2026-11-09
CISA KEV Deadline2026-11-12
Known Ransomware Use No

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Required Action

CISA BOD 26-04 Deadline: 2026-11-12. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA's BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA's "Forensics Triage Requirements" (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

Timeline

DateEvent
2026-08-26Fix committed to the FreeSWITCH repository as PR #3135
2026-08-28FreeSWITCH 1.11.3 released with the enable-chat-api-proto gate
2026-10-28Advisory GHSA-mg63-h38w-8p9p published, stating exploitation of this path has been observed in the wild
2026-11-05CVE-2026-116779 published with a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.8
2026-11-09Added to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
2026-11-12CISA BOD 26-04 remediation deadline