CVE-2026-102895 - GPUStack Improper Authentication Vulnerability

CVE-2026-102895

GPUStack - Unauthenticated Admin via Spoofed Loopback Source, Leading to RCE on Workers

What is GPUStack?

GPUStack is an open-source cluster manager for running AI models on your own hardware. It pools GPUs across a set of worker machines, schedules inference workloads onto them, and exposes OpenAI-compatible API endpoints so applications can talk to locally hosted large language models, embedding models, and image models the same way they would talk to a hosted provider. A server node holds the control plane, the user database, and the configuration; worker nodes run the actual inference backends such as llama.cpp, vLLM, and vox-box.

That design makes a GPUStack server a concentrated target. It stores API keys, worker credentials, and in many deployments cloud-provider secrets used to scale GPU capacity. It has a documented administrative path for defining new inference backends, which is a path to running code on every worker in the pool. And it is commonly placed behind an nginx or Traefik reverse proxy on the same host so it can be reached from a browser. The project is widely deployed: its Docker Hub images had been pulled roughly 942,000 times and the repository carried about 5,978 stars as of 2026-11-05.

Overview

CVE-2026-102895 is an authentication bypass in GPUStack's API authorization layer. In versions before 2.2.0, any request that the server resolves as coming from the loopback address 127.0.0.1 is treated as the built-in administrator, with no credential of any kind, whenever the force_auth_localhost setting is false. False is the default.

Two ordinary deployment patterns make a remote request look like loopback. The first is a same-host reverse proxy: when nginx or an equivalent sits in front of GPUStack and connects to it over 127.0.0.1, every external request arrives with a loopback socket peer, so every external request is admin. No header and no credential are needed. The second applies in embedded gateway mode, where the server honours the X-GPUStack-Real-IP header: a client can simply send X-GPUStack-Real-IP: 127.0.0.1 and be promoted the same way.

From there the impact is total. An attacker can enumerate and modify users, models, and workers, mint a persistent administrator API key with the * scope that survives any later proxy change, read worker and cloud-provider secrets held by the server, and call POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml to define a malicious inference backend, which executes on worker hosts. The vendor advisory records that this chain was used in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment to run reverse shells. CISA added the CVE to the KEV catalog on 2026-11-09 with a BOD 26-04 deadline of 2026-11-12.

Affected Versions

Product Vulnerable Fixed
GPUStack (pip package gpustack, Docker images) All versions before 2.2.0, with force_auth_localhost at its default of false 2.2.0
GPUStack, recommended target - 2.2.2 or later, which also fixes the separate SAML flaw CVE-2026-102894

Technical Details

The flawed logic lives in get_current_user in gpustack/api/auth.py. After the normal credential checks fail, the dependency falls through to a branch that compares the resolved client IP against the literal string 127.0.0.1 and, on a match, returns the built-in administrator. The resolved IP comes from client_ip_getter, which returns the X-GPUStack-Real-IP header value in embedded gateway mode and otherwise the raw socket peer address. Neither input is trustworthy from the server's position: the header is attacker-controlled, and the socket peer is whatever the local proxy happens to be.

The underlying weakness is CWE-287, improper authentication, with CWE-290 (authentication bypass by spoofing) and CWE-346 (origin validation error) as the more specific descriptions. In plain words: the software used the network location a request appeared to come from as proof of who sent it, and that appearance can be manufactured. The loopback branch also applies no restriction by HTTP method or path, so it grants the full administrative API rather than some limited local-management subset.

The attack is network-reachable, needs no privileges and no user interaction, and the first step is a single unauthenticated HTTP request. CVSS 3.1 scores it 9.8 CRITICAL (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). It is trivially automatable against any instance fronted by a same-host proxy.

Discovery

The flaw was reported independently by several parties, which the GPUStack advisory credits as Nikko Enggaliano, Wei Yunzhou, and Rui Yang and Haoyu Wang of Johns Hopkins University. The fix commit landed on 2026-05-19 and shipped in release 2.2.0 on 2026-06-18, with the GitHub Security Advisory following on 2026-07-31 and the CVE identifier reserved on 2026-09-29.

The exploitation report is a separate contribution: Javier Sixto of ulex.fr reported the active in-the-wild attacks, and that report is what the advisory added when the CVE was published on 2026-11-04. A public proof-of-concept has since circulated on exploit aggregators.

Exploitation Context

The vendor states the vulnerability has been observed exploited in the wild against a v2.1.1 deployment, with attackers creating custom inference backends that launched reverse shells on worker hosts. That is the concrete evidence; no named threat actor, campaign, or victim count has been published, and CISA has not flagged the entry for known ransomware use.

No exposure census from Shadowserver, Censys, or GreyNoise had been published as of 2026-11-09. The adoption figures above indicate a large installed base but not how much of it is internet-facing. The practical risk estimate is different from the usual one here, because exposure is not simply a matter of whether the port is open: an instance reachable only through a co-located reverse proxy, which is the recommended production layout, is the worst case rather than a mitigated one.

Note that the gap between the fix and the KEV listing is almost five months. Any deployment still on a pre-2.2.0 build has been exploitable for that entire window, and because step three of the chain mints a persistent admin API key, an upgrade alone does not evict an attacker who already visited.

Remediation

  1. Upgrade to GPUStack 2.2.2 or later. Version 2.2.0 is the minimum that fixes this CVE, but 2.2.2 also closes CVE-2026-102894, an unauthenticated SAML callback account takeover scored 9.1, which is present in the same builds.
  2. If the upgrade cannot be done immediately, set force_auth_localhost=true so that loopback requests must still authenticate. This is the single most effective stopgap.
  3. Strip any client-supplied X-GPUStack-Real-IP header at the reverse proxy or gateway, and make sure the proxy does not present external traffic to GPUStack as loopback. Only accept a real-client-IP header from a trusted, authenticated gateway.
  4. Keep the GPUStack API off untrusted networks entirely, behind a VPN or an authenticating edge, rather than relying on the application to decide who is local.
  5. Assume compromise on any instance that ran a pre-2.2.0 build while reachable. Audit administrator accounts and API keys and revoke anything unrecognized, since a key minted through this bypass remains valid after the upgrade. Review the list of defined inference backends for entries nobody created, and rotate worker credentials and any cloud-provider secrets stored in GPUStack.
  6. Review proxy and application logs for unauthenticated requests to administrative endpoints, for X-GPUStack-Real-IP headers arriving from outside, and for calls to POST /v2/inference-backends/from-yaml. Look back to at least 2026-06-18, and preserve logs and system state before remediating, in line with CISA's Forensics Triage Requirements under BOD 26-04.
  7. Federal civilian agencies must remediate or discontinue use by 2026-11-12. Given a published proof-of-concept, confirmed exploitation, and a single-request entry point, every other operator should treat that date as the outer limit.

Key Details

PropertyValue
CVE ID CVE-2026-102895
Vendor / Product GPUStack - GPUStack
NVD Published2026-11-04
NVD Last Modified2026-11-09
CVSS 3.1 Score9.8
CVSS 3.1 VectorCVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
SeverityCRITICAL
CWE CWE-287 find similar ↗
CISA KEV Added2026-11-09
CISA KEV Deadline2026-11-12
Known Ransomware Use No

CVSS 3.1 Breakdown

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Required Action

CISA BOD 26-04 Deadline: 2026-11-12. Apply mitigations in accordance with vendor instructions, ensuring compliance with CISA's BOD 26-04 Prioritizing Security Updates Based on Risk (see URL in Notes) guidance and CISA's "Forensics Triage Requirements" (see URL in Notes). Follow applicable BOD 26-04 guidance for cloud services or discontinue use of the product if mitigations are unavailable. Stakeholders are responsible for evaluating each asset's internet exposure and ensuring adherence to BOD 26-04 patching guidelines.

Timeline

DateEvent
2026-05-19Fix commit removing the loopback auto-admin path lands in the GPUStack repository
2026-06-18GPUStack 2.2.0 released, carrying the fix
2026-07-31GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-gj9m-f8ph-pmhr published
2026-09-29CVE-2026-102895 reserved and the advisory updated
2026-11-04CVE published; the advisory adds a report of in-the-wild exploitation against a v2.1.1 deployment
2026-11-09Added to CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog
2026-11-12CISA BOD 26-04 remediation deadline